We exploit a natural experiment provided by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) to test for efficiency wage considerations in a low-wage sector, the UK residential care homes industry. Empirical results provide support to the wagesupervision trade-off prediction of the shirking model and suggest that the NMW may have operated as an efficiency wage. Our findings are in line with an efficiency wages rationale of a non-negative employment effect of the minimum wage which can explain the recent evidence from the care homes sector that the NMW introduction generated only moderate employment effects.
Introduction
Efficiency Wages theory has been used to explain downward wage rigidity at the microeconomic level (Weiss, 1991) and thus involuntary unemployment as well as labour market segmentation (Bulow and Summers, 1986) and wage differentials across firms or industries (Krueger and Summers, 1988) .
The essence of the theory is that wages do not only determine employment but also affect employees" productive behavior or quality 1 , and that is why, under certain conditions, it is optimal for employers to set compensation above the market clearing level in order to recruit, retain or motivate employees.
The main criticism against the validity of efficiency wages has been the so-called "bonding critique" (Carmichael, 1985 (Carmichael, , 1990 , according to which there are more efficient mechanisms that can be used to solve the problem of asymmetric information, as bonding, that should be preferred to wage premiums. However, any restrictions to the implementation of "bonding" should open the door to efficiency wages (Katz, 1986) .
Theoretical arguments, casual observations and even anecdotal evidence have been offered in order to support or dismiss whether these restrictions are actually the case. According to Dickens et al. (1985) , efficiency wages cannot be dismissed on a priory theoretical ground and 1 Under asymmetric information higher relative wages decrease shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) , reduce quits and turnover costs (Salop, 1979) , improve the quality of potential employees (Weiss, 1980) and workers" association with the firm (Akerlof, 1982). evidence is needed and thus the validity of efficiency wages is an issue that can only be resolved empirically.
Although, there is a vast number of empirical studies of efficiency wages, there are many who view the evidence as unpersuasive and inconclusive (Manning and Thomas, 1997; Autor, 2003) . This is mainly due to numerous problems that render the empirical testing of efficiency wages particularly vexing. The majority of problems could be possibly summarized as related to identification 2 , as for example efficiency wages are by definition endogenous 3 and arise under situations of asymmetric information which makes it impossible for the econometrician to observe the outcomes of interest (worker"s action or type).
Out of the numerous empirical attempts to test some of the implications of efficiency wages models, the most credible studies to date are those that find ingenious ways to properly address the identification problem either by analysing samples of firms in sectors where there is limited concern of unobserved heterogeneity (Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991; Krueger, 1991) , or by exploiting natural experiments (Groshen and Krueger, 1990; Holzer et al., 1991; Rebitzer, 1995) . Most of these studies report evidence of a negative relationship between higher 2 This is mainly a problem of empirical studies based on observational data. In recent years there has been also evidence produced by laboratory experiments providing some support to efficiency wages and in particular to the "gift-exchange" model (Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993, Fehr and Falk, 1999) . However, the results of these experiments have been challenged by more recent evidence (Gneezy and List, 2006 ) that fail to provide supp ort to the "fair wage-effort" hypothesis (at least in the long-run) and by the criticism related to the extent that the behaviour of laboratory subjects can be a good indication of actual behavior in labour markets.
wages and alternative means of regulating employees" effort (supervision) which is consistent with a prediction of the shirking model of efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) . This evidence can be viewed as indirect evidence of positive effects of higher wages on workers" productivity.
The main criticism of the above studies has been that the evidence produced is necessary but not sufficient for efficiency wages, as it is also consistent with other explanations4 and thus the evidence provided can be seen as "weak" evidence in support of efficiency wages. Another important limitation of studies exploiting a quasi-experimental design derives from its central innovation, i.e. the exploitation of the unusual features of a specific labour market, as one cannot support that the same results would be the case in another setting or labour market. Despite the limitations and criticisms there are many who believe that this evidence is as "good as it gets" (Autor, 2003) .
As Rebitzer (1995) puts it "It is too early to know whether the theory of efficiency wages will survive rigorous empirical investigation.
The difficult econometric problems such investigations confront make it unlikely that any single study will settle the issue decisively. The empirical fate of efficiency wage theory will more likely be determined by evidence from a variety of different investigations-each having important limitations and qualifications."
The purpose of this paper is to offer an empirical test of the shirking model by exploiting the link between efficiency wages and the minimum wage. Such link can be justified firstly by the theoretical argument that a binding minimum wage and other features of low-wage labour markets impose constraints in the implementation of first-best contracts and thus open the door to efficiency wages (Krueger, 1991; Georgiadis, 2006) . Another link is offered by the fact that efficiency wages models (Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer and Taylor, 1995) have been deployed to explain the striking evidence of a non-negative employment effect of the minimum wage, produced by several empirical minimum wage studies since the early 1990s Krueger, 1994, 1995) .
Finally and probably most importantly the minimum wage satisfies the above market-clearing property of the efficiency wage as it creates a wedge between the wage at the current job and alternative wages and provides a quasi-experimental design to study any effects of wages on worker"s productive behaviour.
Our identification strategy is based on exploiting variation in wages generated by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW), to identify the relationship between wages and monitoring and thus test for the wage-supervision trade-off implication of the shirking model on a sector of very low-wage firms, the residential care homes sector.
The care homes sector seems ideal to test for efficiency wages considerations as previous research (Machin, Manning and Rahman, 2003; Machin and Wilson, 2004) on the effects of the NMW in the sector found that although the wage structure in the sector was heavily affected by the NMW there were only moderate negative employment effects, which is quite puzzling considering also that care home owners could not pass the cost of higher wages onto prices (as prices were capped by local authorities) and the absence of evidence on other kind of offsets (Metcalf, 2007) . Therefore, efficiency wagetype adjustments may provide a potential explanation of the findings of previous research as for a moderate employment effect to materialise after a significant increase in wage costs "something got to give" 4 .
We find evidence that in care homes in which the NMW had larger impact on the wage bill, monitoring, as measured by different ratios of supervisory to supervised staff fell by more, compared to homes that were less affected by the NMW. We also find evidence that supervisors and supervised staff are substitutes in production which implies that labour demand adjustments to the NMW introduction cannot be consistent with a wage-supervision trade-off.
Thus, our findings suggest that the higher wages costs generated by the NMW were partly offset by gains in monitoring costs and that the NMW may have operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector.
Overall, our paper contributes to the efficiency wages literature by adding a credible test of the shirking model to the few existing studies and by producing evidence in support of efficiency wages. Moreover, we also fill a gap of the minimum wage literature by providing an empirical investigation of efficiency wage models (Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer; developed to explain the evidence of a non-negative minimum wage employment elasticity, which has been missing in the literature Krueger, 1995, Zavodny, 1996) . The absence of such a test is quite striking considering the appeal that Card and Krueger (1995) made more than ten years ago that "a rigorous evaluation of the alternative models must await additional research".
In this way our study provides evidence which supports an efficiency wage explanation of the recent findings from the care homes sector (Machin et al., 2003; Machin and Wilson; 2004) .
The paper is structured as follows: the following section presents a simple model that explains how the minimum wage may operate as an efficiency wage by conveying rents to affected employees and derives the structural equation of interest for our empirical analysis. Section 3 discusses the main empirical problems that hinder empirical studies of the wage-supervision trade-off and presents the identification strategy we adopt in order to tackle them and section four discusses the data collection and offers some sample descriptive statistics. Finally, section five presents and discusses the empirical results and section six then concludes.
A Simple Model
Consider a simple extension of the model developed by Rebitzer and Taylor 5 (1995) to provide a rationale of the empirical findings of a nonnegative minimum wage employment elasticity that accounts for endogenously determined supervision 6 .
In particular, the instantaneous probability of detecting a shirker is given by:
, where N and L is the number of supervisors and production workers respectively 7 . In line with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Rebitzer and Taylor (1995) under this environment the non-shirking condition (NSC)
arising from worker"s decision making problem and firm"s profit maximisation can be expressed as follows:
, where w * is the optimal (efficiency) wage of production workers 8 , which is expressed as a function of the outside option µ, the level of effort e, the discount rate r, the probability of finding a job s, and the 5 Rebitzer and Taylor modified the Shapiro-Stiglitz model (1984) by treating the probability of detecting a shirker as inversely related to the size of the workforce (in the Shapiro-Stiglitz model the probability of detecting a shirker follows a Poisson process) but assume that supervisory capacity is fixed. 6 Rebitzer and Taylor"s (RT) key result is a special prediction of a more general model presented by Calvo and Wellisz (CW ) (1979) (Manning, 1995) . The two models differ only in terms of the returns to scale to production, as RT assume decreasing and CW constant returns to scale. However, their results are the same qualitatively, i.e. that a just binding minimum wage increases the employment of affected workers. 7 We assume that 1 in equation (1) is never binding, otherwise the model specialises to the standard one in the theory of the firm. Odiorne (1963) and Gordon (1990 Gordon ( , 1994 suggest that the supervisor to staff ratio is likely to be highly correlated with the extent of monitoring. 8 We assume that there are shirking considerations for production workers but not for supervisors who are paid their outside option. This is the case if bonding can be implemented for supervisors but not for production employees which may b e true if one thinks of supervisors as high-skilled, high-wage workers, for whom the minimum wage does not prevent employers tilting optimally the wage-tenure profile (Krueger, 1991) .
quit rate q. Equation (2) expresses the prediction of the standard shirking model that in equilibrium, ceteris paribus, there is a trade-off between wages and the probability of detection as measured by the supervisor to staff ratio N/L . Equation (2) can be rearranged to express monitoring intensity as a function of the optimal wage:
In partial equilibrium the introduction/increase of a minimum wage under this framework will raise wages above alternative opportunities 9 , which in turns increases the penalty of shirking, decreases worker"s propensity to shirk and leads to relaxation of monitoring intensity.
In general equilibrium, where all firms in the sector pay the minimum wage, we need some unemployment to prevent shirking.
Under this model a binding minimum wage decreases employment at the firm level (see appendix A for proof ), which in general equilibrium leads to a reduction in the probability of finding a job s 10 , which in turns results to an equilibrium outcome under which all employees are paid the minimum wage and do not shirk, but they are supervised less stringently 11 .Equation (3) is the equation of interest for our empirical 9 In the model this is µ which stands for the value of leisure which is equal to the market clearing wage. 10 The probability of finding a job is expected to fall even if employment is unchanged as a result of the minimum wage introduction/increase (this is the case in our model if the minimum wage is set infinitesimally above the initial optimal wage), as labour force participation is expected to rise.
11 This point suggests that the key prediction of the model of Rebitzer and Taylor that in partial equilibrium a just binding minimum wage increases employment, is not robust under general equilibrium. This is because if employment increases then s
analysis in the following sections.
Empirical Problems and Identification Strategy
This section discusses the econometric problems that arise when one attempts to estimate an empirical counterpart of equation (3), and the strategy we implement in order to tackle them.
Empirical tests of the wage-supervision trade-off have been mainly hindered by endogeneity arising from simultaneity, omitted variables and measurement error (Groshen and Krueger, 1990 , Rebitzer, 1995 , Brunello, 1995 .
Simultaneity arises because wages and supervision intensity are motivation devices which are set optimally and simultaneously to minimise costs per efficiency unit of labour (Georgiadis, 2006) . Moreover, as suggested by Rebitzer (1995) , unobserved features of human resource policies that affect employees" motivation (e.g. employee screening) will be also correlated with supervision intensity and wages. The likely effect of failing to control for these factors will be a positive omitted variable bias which masks any underlying trade-off between wages and supervision (Leonard, 1987; Rebitzer, 1995) .
Another concern in empirical studies of the trade-off arises by measurement error in supervision intensity. This is because most studies will increase and motivation will fall and thus the wage should be increased further to prevent shirking. This process will continue up to the point where the increase in the wage will lead to a fall in employment in partial equilibrium.
use the ratio of supervisors to supervised as a proxy for monitoring, which does not distinguish between supervisors whose primary job is regulating the activities of lower level employees and employees with supervisory job titles who nevertheless have a direct role to play in production. Thus, the supervisor to supervised ratio tends to overestimate the extent of monitoring (Kruse, 1992) .
Moreover, the supervisors to staff ratio is associated with the quantity of monitoring but not the quality (Brunello, 1995) . However, measurement error seems to be more of a concern in these studies, as they attempt to estimate an empirical analogue of equation (2), where supervision is a right-hand side variable and thus measurement error leads to inconsistent estimates of the causal effect of interest.
Alternatively, if one estimates an equation with supervision as the dependent variable (as in equation (3)) measurement error is less of a problem, although it leads to a loss in precision 12 .
Another potential source of upward bias in the wage-supervision relationship may also arise because of labour demand adjustments, as an increase in the wage of supervised staff may lead to an increase in the ratio of supervisors to production workers, provided that the production function allows for some substitution between the two inputs (Groshen and Krueger, 1990) .
A final problem highlighted in the empirical literature of efficiency wages, is that there are alternative theories that are consistent with a wage-supervision trade-off (Kruse, 1992) . One of these theories is the "sorting by ability model" (Groshen and Krueger, 1990) , which it is predicated on the assumption that more able employees are supervised less stringently because they need less co-ordination and guidance on the job.
If low-ability workers are paid lower wages, then this model also generates a prediction of the wage-supervision trade-off, as a costminimising firm will decrease wages up to the point where the marginal benefit of a fall in wages which also leads to a fall in the average ability of workforce is exactly off by the increase in supervision costs, as lower average ability of workforce will require more intensive supervision.
Empirically this problem is translated to an omitted ability bias, which leads to a downward bias in the estimate of the wage-supervision relationship.
Our empirical strategy is based on exploiting the exogenous variation in wages generated by the 1999 introduction of the UK National Minimum Wage (NMW) in a very low-pay sector, the residential care homes industry. We estimate the causal effect of the change in the wage of supervised employees before and after the NMW introduction on the change in their supervision intensity by IV, where measures of the impact of the NMW across homes are used as instruments for the change in the ji wage.
In particular we are estimating the following system of equations:
,where ∆lnS it is the change in the natural logarithm of the ratio of supervisors to supervised employees at home i between the period before (t − 1) and after (t) the NMW introduction, ∆lnWit is the change in the natural logarithm of average hourly wage of supervised employees at home i in the before and after NMW introduction period, MIN it−1 is a measure of the impact of the national minimum wage on the pay of supervised employees at home i (defined later), X it−1 is a vector of (t − 1) level home and supervised employees" characteristics at (t − 1) and u it and v it are error terms. The key parameter of interest is β 1 , which measures the relationship between wage changes and the change in supervision intensity after controlling for other factors such as home and workers" characteristics. Machin et al. (2003) used two measures of the impact of the UK NMW, the one is the p r op o rti o n o f workers at home paid below their age specific NMW before the NMW introduction and the other is the wage gap which is the proportional increase in the weekly wage bill if the wages of all workers paid below the NMW before the NMW introduction are raised to reach their age-specific NMW. The wage gap is defined as follows:
, where h ji is the weekly hours worked by worker j in firm i, Wji is the hourly wage of worker j in firm i, and is the minimum wage relevant for worker j in firm i (the adult rate or the development rate designed for those between 18 and 21 inclusive).
The key identifying assumptions of our empirical strategy are that MIN i,t−1 is a strong and valid instrument for the change in the wage before and after the 1999 NMW introduction. A potential threat to the validity of the instrument arises by the fact that because the minimum wage is set at a national level, variation across homes is driven from variation in the initial level of wages across homes. Machin et al. (2003) tested this identifying assumption and found evidence that although the relationship between the change in the wage and initial wages was negative in a counterfactual period where no minimum wage was introduced it has shifted markedly in the period of the NMW introduction 13 .
Moreover, the nature of the data is such that limits problems of unobserved heterogeneity, as the care homes sector is characterised by homogeneous occupations and workers" skills and homogeneous services (Machin et al., 2003) . Unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variables problems are further tackled by the fact that we observe outcomes at two points in time (before and after the April 1999 NMW introduction), 13 This is the same as testing for common trends in wages between high wage (less affected) homes or for mean reversion. Although the evidence suggests that the larger part of the variation in MINi,t−1 is driven by the NMW introduction, there is a minor concern for mean reversion and that is why Machin et al. (2003) estimate specifications including controls for differences in initial wages that abate this problem. Measurement error as discussed above is expected to be less of a problem compared to studies where supervision intensity is a causing variable.
Another concern, as pointed out previously, arises by labour demand adjustments which are expected to have an effect in the relative employment of supervisors and production workers. The direction of labour demand adjustments depends on the assumptions about the production technology.
For example, if high-skilled supervisory workers and low-skilled production employees are (gross) substitutes in production then we expect that as the mini-mum wage renders the latter relatively more costful, there will be an increase in the supervisor to staff ratio. In this case the labour demand effect will counteract the efficiency wage effect, and thus evidence supporting a negative relationship between wages and supervision would suggest that the efficiency wage effect dominates and that the wage-supervision trade-off is even larger in magnitude. We touch at this issue in one of the following sections where we present estimates of the elasticity of substitution between supervisors and supervisees.
The Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data used in our analysis were collected by the Centre for Economic Performance at LSE through postal surveys implemented before and after the April 1999 UK NMW introduction, as the main objective was to use the collected information to evaluate the economic effects of minimum wages (see Machin et al., 2003 and Wilson, 2004 , for details about the survey design).
Questionnaires were addressed to home managers asking question on home characteristics (ownership, whether home is part of larger organisation, the number of registered beds, the number of residents, etc.). Most importantly managers were also asked to provide data on job title, sex, age, length of service, possession of a nursing qualification, weekly hours and weekly wages for all workers 14 . Table 1 (see tables   section Other prevalent characteristics of the sector is that the vast majority of employees are female (around 92% in both the full and the balanced sample), the average employee age is around 40 years old, the principal occupation is that of care assistants 17 and that only one in ten employees has a nursing qualification (the only relevant qualification/skill in the sector).
In general agency and monitoring problems are expected to be prevalent in the sector. Although care homes are small they operate twenty four hours a day and seven days a week which makes it difficult for supervisors to check employees" effort but even if supervisors observe effort it is difficult to verify it unless they have the necessary 15 This is the adult rate, with the development rate (the effective minimum wage for those aged between 18 and 21 inclusive) set at £3. The adult rate is expected to be the main rate applied as employees between 18-21 years old are a very small fraction of total employment in the care homes sector and the evidence suggests that the development rate wasn"t used for the majority of those people covered by the development rate (Metcalf, 2004) . 16 The wage gap for each category provides an indication of the "bite" of the NMW on the wages of each employees" category. The average wage gap for managers and for senior carers is 0.7% and 0.8% respectively whereas for non-managers and nonsenior carers is 4.2% and 6.1% respectively.
17 Care assistants include senior, day and junior carers and comprise on average 60% of employees in the sector with the vast majority of them being day and junior carers (around 85%). The occupation of care assistants is among the lowest paid occupations in the UK (Machin et al., 2003). qualifications to assess the standard and quality of care provided by employees.
In the care homes sector some of the managers/matrons are usually the owners of the home (Machin et al., 2004) and thus have a strong incentive to perform the main supervisory duties as residual claimants of the firm"s surplus (see Krueger, 1991 for more discussion on this). Table 2 presents information on the shares of managers and non-managers in the care homes sector engaging in supervisory responsibilities from the LFS 2001-2008 and indicates that 99% of managers in the sector report that they carry out supervisory responsibilities on the job 18 . Moreover , table 2 also suggests that the majority of non-managerial employees do not engage in supervisory activities in the residential care homes sector.
This may further suggest that the distinction between managerial and non-managerial employees may provide a potential distinction between supervisory and supervised workers.
However, one may still be concerned that the managerial/nonmanagerial distinction may not provide a perfect distinction between supervisors and supervisees as this may miss the few non-managerial employees that may perform supervisory duties. Non-managerial employees are carers and support staff such as administrative clerks, domestics, cleaners, nurses and cooks but in the majority of homes in 18 The 1998/1999 care homes survey didn"t include questions on supervision firstly because it was based on a short questionnaire due to concerns for low response rate and because the key information of interest was employment and the internal wage structure at home. This is why we rely on other data sources to identify supervisors and supervisees in the sector. the sample there are no support employees except of cooks and thus in most cases a home"s staff consists of managers, carers and cooks 19 . Thus, we do not expect that the lack of information on support staff with supervisory responsibilities will cause systematic underestimation of the supervisor to staff ratio 20 .
In the case of cares and care-assistants there is some evidence from case studies conducted by the Low Pay Commission (LPC report, 2008) investigating how several care homes coped with the NMW increases (LPC report, 2008) which suggests that in some cases senior carers may have supervisory responsibilities because of seniority and qualifications.
This seems to be supported by the fact that the share of senior carers in all carers in the sample, which is 15% is very similar to the percentage of carers reporting supervisory responsibilities in the LFS presented in Thus, in our analysis presented in the following section we consider two different ratios of supervisors to supervisees as proxies for supervision intensity across homes, the ratio of managers to non-managers and the ratio of managers and senior carers to all other non-managerial employees in the care home. Table 1 indicates that there is on average one manager to every three 19 This is because managers may carry out administrative work and carers with a nursing qualification and junior carers may substitute for nurses and domestics and cleaners respectively. 20 If this is not the case then the discussion in the previous section on problems caused by measurement error in supervision intensity suggests that it doesn"t not expected to cause serious problems in estimation. 21 Unfortunately the LFS does not include information that allows us to distinguish senior and non-senior carers.
non-managerial employees and the same ratio is one over two when measured in relative hours. As expected the ratio of supervisors to supervisees both in bodies and weekly hours increases when one includes also as supervisors the senior carers at home.
As presented in table 1 the average hourly wage of supervised employees (non-managerial, non-managerial excluding senior carers)
increased markedly between the pre and post-minimum periods for both the full sample and the balanced panel of homes. Moreover both supervision intensity proxies seem to increase between the pre and postminimum periods. However, the changes on supervision intensity between the pre and post-minimum wage introduction period could be the result of many forces as well as the NMW introduction and thus in order to isolate the effect of wage changes driven by the NMW on supervision intensity across homes we turn to the econometric analysis of the next section.
Results
The first stage of our empirical strategy is to estimate equation (5) where the main causing variable, the change in log hourly wage of supervised employees is regressed on the instrument(s) (the measure of the impact of the minimum wage). Results of the first stage regressions are presented by Machin et al. (2003) who regress the change in the wage separately on the proportion of workers paid initially below the NMW and the wage gap and find strong positive effects across specifications. Machin et al. (2003) in the sense that the average hourly wage for each group of potential supervised employees is regressed on the different measures of the impact of the NMW on this particular group of employees excluding or including other controls. We also include specifications where the change in log hourly wage of each category of supervisees is regressed on both instruments. This is done for two reasons: a) to check whether including both instruments explains a larger part of the variation in the change in the average wage at home and thus whether precision of the second stage estimates could be improved and b) to assess which of the two measures is the best proxy of the impact of the minimum wage 22 .
Results presented in table 3 suggest that non-managerial employees in a care home that had 10% of such employees paid below their age-specific minimum, experienced a 1.5% increase in the growth of average hourly wages relative to non-managerial employees in a home with no such employee paid below the NMW. Alternatively, non-managerial employees excluding senior carers in a firm that required 10% increase in its weekly wage bill of these employees to comply with the minimum experienced a 9.3% increase in the 22 The two measures are strongly positively correlated which makes sense as they intend to measure the same thing but they may be quite different. According to Machin et al., (2003) "if the minimum wage caused all workers initially paid below it to lose their jobs, then the headcount might be the better measure but if it is more difficult to raise the productivity of those a long way below the minimum wage than those near it, then the wage gap measure might be better". average wage growth respectively relative to similar workers in a firm paid at least the minimum wage to them.
Comparing estimates from specifications including each measure of the NMW impact separately with those that include both measures seems to suggest that including both instruments will not probably lead to more efficient estimation of the wage-elasticity of supervision intensity compared to the case where the wage gap is only used as an instrument for wages. In specifications where only the wage gap is included as an instrument the R-squared is the same as in specifications with both instruments in the right-hand side, whereas in the latter case the strength of the correlation of the wage gap and the associated change in average hourly wages at home is slightly smaller than the former 23 .
This simply means that the wage gap is a better measure of the impact of the minimum wage than the initial proportion of low-paid employees at home and thus the best strategy is to use only this as an instrument for the change in the wage.
Moreover, estimated results are fairly similar with or without controls for differences in initial wages which further suggests that endogenous variation in the change in the wage driven by initial wages is negligible, a result which provides further support to the validity of the second stage of the 2SLS estimation.
23 This is because the inclusion of the proportion of affected workers together with the wage gap as a regressor picks up some of the variation in the wage gap. Note also that when both instruments are included as regressors the initial proportion of affected workers is insignificant. estimation results of the structural equation (4), using either measure of supervision intensity. We find a negative and significant effect of the change in log average hourly wage of non-managerial employees on the change in the log ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees measured both in bodies and in hours.
In particular 2SLS estimates of the wage elasticity of the ratio of managerial to non-managerial employees suggest that on average a 1% increase in the aver-age hourly wage of non-managerial employees at home generates a 2.17% fall in the number and 1.88% reduction in the hours of managerial employees relative to the number and hours of nonmanagerial workers at home, respectively. This result seems to be consistent with the wage-monitoring trade-off story of the shirking model.
Moreover, we find that the wage elasticity of supervision intensity is negative also for the case of non-managerial employees excluding senior carers but the estimated coefficient is significant only when the supervisors to staff ratio is measured in bodies. The lack of significance in the case when the latter ratio is measured in hours may be due to the presence of a stronger counteracting effect driven by the substitution of managers/senior carers for non-managers that masks the true magnitude of the wage-supervision trade-off for non-managers excluding senior carers. The estimate of the wage-supervision trade-off for these employees suggest a 1% increase in the average hourly wage of non-managerial employees such as day and junior carers and other support staff will result in a 2.3 % fall in the number of managers and senior carers per non-manager.
All in all the evidence produced seems to support a negative effect of the change in the wage generated by the NMW introduction in the supervision intensity of non-managerial employees and of non managerial employees excluding senior carers. The evidence also suggests that the OLS is negative but smaller in magnitude than the 2SLS supporting a positive OLS bias.
However, one needs to check whether these results are merely due to labour demand adjustments arising from the change in the relative wage of supervisors and supervisees caused by the NMW introduction. As discussed in one of the previous sections if supervisors and supervisees are gross substitutes then the fall in the wage costs of the former relative to the latter triggered by the NMW introduction would result in an increase in the employment of supervisors relative to supervisees, which in turns will tend to mask a wage-supervision trade-off and thus will make the estimates of a trade-off even more compelling. 24 . OLS estimates are uniformly positive and significant. Results 24 2SLS estimates are not likely to be informative in this case because the wages of supervisors are hardly affected by the NMW and thus variation in wages of seem to support substitution of managers for non-managers in production as we find that a 1% increase in the wage of non-managerial employees relative to the wage of managers leads to an increase in the relative use of managers by 0.27% in numbers and by 0.36% in hours.
Similarly, a 1% increase in the wage of non-managers including only support staff and day and junior carers relative to the wage of managers and senior carers increases the ratio managers to non-managers by 0.25% in bodies and 0.45% in hours.
Tables 4 and 5 also reveal that the pattern of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution is inversely related to the magnitude of the wage-elasticity of supervision intensity i.e. the larger the elasticity of substitution of supervisors for supervisees the smaller in magnitude the wage elasticity of supervision intensity for the corresponding supervisees.
This finding is consistent with the explanation given above for the insignificant effect of the change in the wage on the supervisor to staff ratio measured in hours when supervisors include managers and senior carers. Moreover, this result further suggests that efficiency wage effects on supervision intensity are likely to counteract with labour demand effects and thus our estimates of the wage-supervision trade-off can be thought as a lower bound.
Our findings that OLS estimates of the wage elasticity of monitoring intensity at home are uniformly positively biased across all supervisees relative to supervisors will coincide with variation in the wage of supervisees producing results similar to table 4. specifications compared to the 2SLS estimates provide further support to the shirking model which predicts that omitted features of human resources and personnel policy that are correlated with employees" motivation/productivity tend to mask any wage-supervision that may be in operation (Leonard, 1987; Rebitzer, 1995) .
On the other hand a positive OLS bias is not consistent with the "sorting by ability model", where omitted ability bias is predicted to be negative as more able employees are paid higher wages and are supervised less stringently 25 .
The latter evidence provides indirect support to the tenet of efficiency wages that wage rents 26 are an employees" motivation device, which can result in productivity or other efficiency gains (in this case gains in monitoring costs). Based on our theoretical model, the NMW introduction will increase wages above the profit maximizing level and thus any wage costs will be less than offset by gains in terms of monitoring costs resulting in a fall in firm"s profitability. This latter prediction reconciles with the evidence produced by Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2006) who find negative effects of the 1999 NMW introduction on the profitability of residential care homes sector.
Efficiency wage-type of adjustments to the NMW as monitoring costs offsets seem to provide a potential explanation of why although the wage structure in the care homes sector was heavily affected there were only moderate employment effects, as evidence by Machin et al. (2003) and Metcalf seem to rule out the possibility of other potential offsets such as price and effort increases and cuts in training provision and fringe benefits 27 as a response to the NMW introduction.
Overall, our findings seem to support the wage-supervision trade-off prediction of the shirking model and to suggest that because wage rents generated by the NMW introduction were partly offset by a fall in supervision costs, the NMW operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector.
This evidence apart from providing a potential explanation the recent findings on the employment effects of the NMW introduction in the care homes sector also provides empirical support to efficiency wages models of the mini-mum wage literature (Calvo and Wellisz, 1979; Manning, 1995; Rebitzer, 1995) .
Conclusions
27 At the time of the NMW introduction there was no statutory training provision in the care homes sector. This was introduced in 2000 by the Care Standards Act which has set statutory requirements for the achievement of NVQ qualifications for the workforce in residential care homes. Moreover Metcalf (2007) suggests that "there is not much scope for cutting back on fringe benefits like subsidized meals or generous pension provision because the incidence of such benefits for minimum wage workers is low both absolutely and relative to higher paid workers".
Efficiency wages cannot be dismissed on a priory theoretical grounds and evidence is needed. The large number of empirical studies in the field, except of some few credible attempts, hasn"t produced persuasive or conclusive evidence mainly due to empirical problems that render the empirical investigation of efficiency wages particularly vexing. More credible empirical studies are needed in order to decide the fate of efficiency wages theory.
In this paper, we exploit the ideal research design provided by the UK NMW introduction in a very low-pay sector, the residential care homes in order to over-come any identification problems associated with testing the wagesupervision trade-off prediction of the shirking model. The NMW introduction produces exogenous variation in care homes wages and as long as there is some unemployment, generates rents to employees creating a wedge between the wage received at the current job and expected alternative opportunities, which is the defining property of efficiency wages.
We find evidence consistent with a wage-supervision trade-off for nonmanagerial employees which provides support to the shirking model. This evidence suggests that higher wage costs generated by the NMW introduction were at least partly offset by lower monitoring expenses which implies that the NMW have operated as an efficiency wage in the care homes sector. This result also explains the recent findings of moderate negative employment effects in the sector as a result of the NMW introduction. Our analysis also provides a direct test that supports efficiency wages models developed to explain empirical findings of a non-negative employment effect of the minimum wage, which has been missing in the literature. In the 2SLS estimation we use the wage-gap for non-managers and the wage-gap for non-managers excluding senior carers as an instrument for the change in the average hourly wage of non-managers and non-managers excluding senior carers respectively. Controls include: proportion female, average age, proportion with nursing qualification, average intensity of work, proportion of residents who either pay local authority prices for beds or who have their care paid for by the Department of Social Security (DSS), region dummies, response month dummies, whether part of larger organisation and ownership type. In each specification the change in log hourly wage, instruments and workers" controls are computed for the same group of employees. , where e is effort which is assumed to be binary (1 if working and 0 is shirking) and c is the wage of supervisors. Substituting the NSC in the profit function and assuming that when the NSC binds workers will always work the profit maximisation problem can be written as follows:
Tables
The first order conditions are given by the following equations:
The change in employment after the introduction/increase of a minimum wage is given if we totally differentiate equation (A.4 , by (A.5) and the fact that cN Lw =cN w /L, it is implied that employment does not change, after the imposition of a just binding minimum wage (Π Lw =0) and thus employment is expected to fall for minimum wage increases above a left neighborhood of the optimal wage. This result suggests that the positive employment effect of the minimum wage in the model of Rebitzer and Taylor hinges heavily on the assumption that supervision is fixed.
Although the results suggest that in a more general setting the shirking model is not consistent with a positive employment effect of the minimum wage, the predictions can still reconcile with the bulk of recent empirical evidence which point towards a small negative or negligible minimum wage employment effect (Machin et al., 2003 
